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AN ANALYSIS OF THE GATT-COMPATIBILITY OF THE
NEW FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past fourteen years, the United States has been em-
broiled in a dispute with its major trading partners over whether the
Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC)1 provisions consti-
tute a prohibited export subsidy under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' In response to increasing pressure
from the GATT Council,' which considered imposing penalties on
the United States for continuing the use of the DISC, the Reagan
Administration agreed in October 1982 to propose a GATT-accept-
able, DISC revision to Congress.4 In August 1983, the Administra-
tion submitted a proposal to replace DISC with an offshore entity
known as a Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC).5 Congress passed the
Foreign Sales Corporation Act (Act) on June 27, 1984 as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, signed into law by President Reagan on
July 18, 1984.' The FSC provision became effective January 1,
© 1986 by Jeffrey F. Ryan
1. DISC was enacted in 1971 to stimulate American exports by relaxing and simplify-ing certain corporate income laws and by providing American exporters with the opportunity
to obtain an indefinite, interest-free income tax deferral on at least 25% of their net exportincome. Although the DISC produced large profits for those companies which took advantage
of it, the United States trading partners objected to it as an illegal export subsidy underGATT. S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1971). Such partners include the Euro-pean Economic Community (E.E.C.), Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden. Wagner, ForeignSales Corporation Act Replaces DISC Tax Incentive, Bus. AM., Aug. 6, 1984, at 17 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Wagner].
2. Foreign Sales Corporation Act, 1983: Hearings on S. 1804 Before the SenateComm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. GATT isdefined as "a multilateral international agreement which is today the principal instrument for
the regulation of world trade." Id.
3. The GATT Council is comprised of member nations who were contracting parties toGATT. It serves a function similar to a congressional committee in that it reviews current
issues and complaints by its constituents. Id.
4. See 17 TAX NOTES 708 (Nov. 29, 1982).
5. An FSC is an off-shore corporation which can be used, as of Jan. 1, 1985, as an
exporting vehicle by domestic corporations. An FSC cannot be located in the United StatesCustoms Zone. The benefit of utilizing this new export vehicle is that a United States exporter
is allowed to earn some exempt and non-taxable income on its exports from the United States.Vernazza & Rosskoph, The U.S. Virgin Islands: A Leading Location for Foreign Sales Cor-
porations, Bus. AM., Sept. 17, 1984, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Vernazza].
6. Wagner, supra note 1, at 17.
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This comment will first trace the genesis of the conflict which
prompted the change from the DISC to the FSC, will determine the
potential legal problems with the Act, and will then propose solu-
tions to those problems. Section II examines how the conflict over the
DISC developed. Section III examines the elements of the FSC
which may conflict with GATT. These elements include the fifty
percent United States content,7 the forgiveness of the DISC income
taxes,' the allowance of the United States possessions as places for
incorporation of a FSC,' and regulations on foreign presence and
management requirements for FSCs.'0 The most objectionable of
these elements to GATT members is the forgiveness of the DISC
income taxes which had previously been deferred." A recent con-
gressional study calculated that "in all $13.6 billion will be for-
given."112  Section IV proposes solutions to the above problems
through elimination of the income tax forgiveness, tighter regulations
and elimination of the United States possessions as qualifying loca-
tions for FSC incorporation.
II. GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT OVER THE DOMESTIC INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES CORPORATION
GATT was created in 1947 to alleviate the staggering problems
7. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the Act provides
two alternatives to the FSC for small businesses that export: the "interest charge DISC" and
the "small FSC." The interest charge DISC is beyond the scope of this comment. The "small
FSC" will be briefly examined with respect to its foreign presence and economic processes.
Generally, the foreign management and foreign economic process requirements are made
inapplicable to small FSCs. I.R.C. § 924(b)(2)(A) (1984). The effect of this provision of the
Act is to provide small exporters with significant savings in administrative costs, although for-
eign incorporation, office and director requirements must still be met. Furthermore, a small
FSC can perform the "foreign" economic processes within the United States. Treas. Reg. §
1.921-2T(h) (Q&A 12) (1985).
11. The Act provides that all pre-January 1, 1985 accumulated tax-deferred income
generated by DISCs is deemed "previously taxed income." Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, § 805(b), 98 Stat. 678 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as the "TRA"l. As a direct
consequence of this provision, all such income accumulated between January 1, 1972, the
effective date of the DISC provisions, and December 31, 1984, will not be subject to United
States income tax. Sharp, Steele & Jacobson, Foreign Sales Corporations: Export Analysis
and Planning, 63 TAXES 164 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Sharp].
12. Kristof, A Change in Selling Abroad, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1984, § 2, at 27 (Busi-
ness Day) (calculation by David A. Starr, legislative assistant to Howard Metzenbaum (D.
Ohio)) [hereinafter cited Kristof].
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of "free trade" created during the Great Depression. 3 At the end of
World War II, the United States played a major role in interna-
tional trade reforms14 which led to a world trading system. The in-
strument which revolutionized the chaotic system of high tariffs and
restrictions was GATT. As a result of GATT, American and other
exporters enjoy stability in and access to foreign trade markets.
Even with the post-World War II boom in trading by American
exporters, stimulated by the advent of GATT, 5 the United States
foreign trade balance has recently plummeted. In 1981, the United
States experienced a $10 billion trade deficit. 6 By 1983, the deficit
reached $21 billion.17 In recent years, the strength of the American
dollar abroad has caused much of the United States foreign trade
deficit by cutting foreign demand for American exports and by in-
creasing the attractiveness of foreign imports.
The Nixon Administration proposed the DISC in 1971 with
the goal of increasing American exports by relaxing and simplifying
certain corporate income tax laws." This increase in American ex-
ports was achieved by providing American exporters with the oppor-
tunity to obtain an indefinite, interest-free tax deferral on at least
twenty-five percent of their net export income.' 9 The DISC was a
13. During the 1930's, the high Smoot-Hawley tariff sparked retaliation from several
other countries, in the form of similarly high tariffs and distorted bilateral deals in Europe.
Denman, A Fair Deal for Free Trade - The Case for Resisting Rising Protectionist Pressures
in Trans-Atlantic Trade, EUROPE Jan./Feb. 1984, at 11.
14. The reforms in international finance and trade which were developed at the end of
the war were due in large part to the United States efforts. "Under the aegis of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), tariffs and other restrictions were drastically cut in
a series of major trade negotiations." The effect on world trade has been dramatic since 1947
- the West has experienced its greatest increase in prosperity in history. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id.
18. The DISC, while technically a separate entity, needed only to exist on paper (thatis, with no substance beyond the paperwork required to create it, plus a modest initial capitalinvestment of $2,500) in order to qualify its related supplier (normally the owner of the DISC
or an affiliate) for the tax deferral. Cohen & Hankin, A Decade of DISC: Genesis and Analy-
sis, 2 VA. TAx REv. 7, 25 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. The DISC was not required to
conduct any business at all, or even manifest any degree of physical presence, outside of the
United States. See generally Rev. Rul. 72-166, 1972-1 C.B. 220.
19. The reason some exporters could achieve more than the 25% income tax deferral isdue to the alternative formulas available under the law to DISCs. Under the original legisla-
tion, the DISC was deemed to have earned 50% of the net export income of its related sup-plier. A DISC paid no United States taxes on its profits, but the DISC's parent was annually
taxed on at least one-half of the DISC's profits. I.R.C. § 994(a)(2) (1982).
An alternative formula permitted a tax deferral on four percent of the related supplier'sgross sales of a particular product or line of products, plus ten percent of the DISC's own
actual export promotion expenses. Id. at § 994(a)(1). Under a provision known as the "no-loss
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response by the United States government to a perceived disparity
between American and European exporters; 0 according to the
United States government, European exporters gained an advantage
over their American competitors primarily through the differences in
the respective taxation systems. 2'
The enactment of the Foreign Sales Corporation Act was an
attempt by the Reagan Administration and the United States Con-
gress to quell the tide of criticism surrounding the DISC.2 Since its
enactment in 1971, the DISC has been the subject of an ongoing
controversy between the United States and certain other GATT sig-
natories.2" From its inception, the DISC has been attacked as consti-
tuting an illegal "tax privilege" and a "tax incentive to exports"
which violate the United States commitments under the General
Agreement.2 4
The United States taxes domestic corporations on their world-
wide income, including profits from foreign permanent establish-
ments. By contrast, most of the United States foreign trading part-
ners employ a territorial system of taxation that exempts export-
related income attributable to a foreign permanent establishment
from taxes. 5 Major exporting countries such as France, Belgium
and the Netherlands, which use a territorial tax system, have low
taxes on repatriated foreign profits .2  The differences in these sys-
rule," a commission computed using this formula could not exceed the amount of profit earned
on the sale, because such a commission would leave the related supplier with a loss on the
transaction. Treas. Reg. 1.994-1(e) (1975). Both formulas could be used in the same tax year,
allowing the DISC to select the more advantageous commission computation on a transaction-
by-transaction basis if it chose to do so. Other alternatives were also available to DISCs.
20. The United States position was that foreign manufacturing subsidiaries generally
were able to postpone payment of United States income tax while United States exporters were
forced to pay the tax immediately. Goldberg, GATT and Export Incentives: The Proposed
Foreign Sales Corporation, 42 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 32.01, at 32-33 (1984) [here-
inafter cited as Goldberg].
21. Cohen, supra note 18.
22. Sharp, supra note 11.
23. Wagner, supra note 1.
24. Note on Exchange of Views, GATT Doc. L/3574 (Sept. 13, 1971).
25. Wagner, supra note 1.
26. Id. By 1973, both the U.S. and E.E.C. had formally complained to the GATT
membership about the alleged tax export subsidies. The GATT council directed a panel of
experts to examine DISC and the tax practices of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The
GATT panel made separate reports on the four countries (including the U.S.); however, no
action was taken on the reports until December 1981.
The delay in GATT action was due in part to the negotiations which culminated in 1979
with the adoption of an "Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI,
and XXIII" of the General Agreement. See AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 1-.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1
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tems of taxation and the debate over which system was in compli-
ance with GATT mandates, led the European Communities to file a
formal complaint against the United States in 1973.27 The gravamen
of the European Community's complaint, filed with the GATT
Council, was that the DISC was an illegal export subsidy in viola-
tion of GATT."
A. The DISC Provisions
Before examining the European Communities' complaint and
the GATT Council's reaction to it, a rudimentary understanding of
the DISC provisions is necessary. As previously mentioned, the
DISC was created to meet the dual goals of stimulating United
States exports and removing a perceived disadvantage facing United
States corporations involved in exportation. 9 The central mechanism
for achieving these compatible goals was the deferral of a portion of
the United States income tax imposed on qualifying corporations. °
This deferral of the DISC income taxes was achieved by treat-
ing the DISC as "not subject to" federal income tax.3 The legal
fiction created by Congress to explain the "exemption" was that ap-
proximately fifty percent of the DISC income is deemed to have been
distributed to its shareholders at the end of the DISC's taxable
year."2 This distribution was treated as a dividend under the prior
law. The balance of the DISC's taxable income was not taxed until
the time of actual distribution to DISC shareholders.8
The 1976 Tax Report Act changed the tax law resulting in de-
(1979). This agreement is generally known as the "Subsidies Code." An Annex to that Agree-
ment contained an updated "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies," with the relevant section
stating: "(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports,
or direct taxes . . . payable by industry or commercial enterprises."
Significantly, the inclusion of "deferral" in the list brought the DISC clearly within the
prohibited list of export subsidies. On the other hand, the 1981 GATT Qualifier (see infra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text) impliedly approved of the tax systems used in France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, and the GATT council held that territorial systems of taxation
used by these European countries, which do not tax offshore profits from exports, do not
offend the anti-subsidy rules. Wagner, supra note 1.
27. J. Rosenblum, The GAT Qualifier: Its Validity as a Tax Standard and its Effect
on DISC and DISC Alternatives, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 469, 473 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Rosenblum].
28. Id.
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
30. Senate Comm. on the 1971 DISC Legislation, S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1971).
31. I.R.C. § 991 (1971).
32. Id. at § 995(b).
33. Id. at §§ 995, 996.
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creased benefits. However, annual reports prepared by the United
States Treasury Department have continued to attribute billions of
dollars in American exports to the tax incentives provided by the
DISC.3'
A feature of the DISC which is attractive to United States ex-
porting corporations is that the DISC is essentially a "paper com-
pany." ' The DISC legislation has no requirements regarding DISC
employees nor does it require that the DISC "perform any real
function." 6 In fact, the only distinct function37 of the DISC is that it
serves as an accounting entity which determines the amount of de-
ferred income and monitors its use before its eventual taxation at the
shareholder level.
Because the DISC is a mere paper entity with no substantial
operations and must be incorporated in the United States, GATT
considers the economic processes of the DISCs to be located within
the United States."' This domestic nature of the DISC's operations
has been highly criticized by members of GATT.39 The United
States Congress attempted to enhance the DISC's GATT compati-
bility by creating two tests which limit the types of assets the DISC
may own. Those tests are the ninety-five percent "qualified export
receipts" test4° and the "qualified export assets" test."'
Another problem, created by the indistinguishable nature of the
DISC from its parent company or related supplier, involves applica-
tion of the inter-company transfer pricing rules.'2 GATT requires
34. See U.S. DEvT. OF THE TREASURY, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, THE OPERATION AND
EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION (1983). The report esti-
mates that United States exports were $7 to 511 billion higher in 1981 than they would have
been without the DISC. The actual changes in the DISC law are beyond the scope of this
comment.
35. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
36. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-35.
37. "Distinct function" is used to mean separate from a related supplier or parent.
38. Cohen, supra note 18, at 25-29. Economic processes include negotiation, advertising,
solicitation and related activities in connection with the making of a contract.
39. Id. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
40. In order for a DISC to defer its accumulated income from taxation under the former
law, two tests had to be met each year. One test required that at least 95% of the DISC's
revenue each year had to consist of "qualified export receipts," which generally meant gross
receipts from the sale or lease abroad of property which was manufactured, produced, or
grown in the United States. I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(A) (1985).
41. In addition to the "qualified export receipts" test, the DISC had to have at least
95% of its assets at the close of its fiscal year be deemed "qualified export assets," that is,
export property, certain types of loans from the DISC to its related supplier, and some other
specified property. Id. at § 992(a)(1)(B).
42. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-35.
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arm's-length pricing,43 where sales between a DISC and its related
supplier have no similar qualifications."" Instead, the parent com-
pany may sell export property to its DISC and avoid the strict allo-
cation requirements.45 Special inter-company pricing rules permit
the DISC to elect one of the following three pricing rules:
1) four percent of qualified export receipts;
2) fifty percent of the combined taxable income of the DISC
and its related supplier attributable to such sale; or
3) the taxable income based on the sales price actually
charged. 4
6
The net result is that the DISC will select the pricing rule which
gives the greatest amount of deferred income attributable to an ex-
port sale.
B. The Attack on DISC
The deferral of the DISC income, the incorporation of a "paper
company" for solely accounting purposes, the incorporation within
the United States, and the failure to use arm's-length pricing to
transfers between related parties, caused the European Communities
to protest the United States DISC legislation in 1973.47 The com-
plaint filed with the GATT Council challenged the DISC as an ille-
gal export subsidy under article XVI:4 of the General Agreement
which provides that:
Contracting Parties shall cease to grant either directly or indi-
rectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product . . .
which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a
price lower than the comparable price charged for a like prod-
uct to buyers in the domestic market."'
To clarify the meaning of article XVI:4, a GATT working
group, on November 19, 1960, adopted an "illustrative list" of
43. The arm's-length pricing mandated by the 1981 GATT Qualifier applies to trans-
actions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under common control. Hence, it
applies to sales between the parent or related supplier and its FSC. Hearings, supra note 2, at
24.
44. I.R.C. section 428 was the only provision under the former law which required
arm's-length pricing between unrelated parties.
45. "Strict allocation" means between supplier and the FSC which buys the export
products from its parent and then sells them abroad for a profit.
46. I.R.C. § 994(a)(1)-(3) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 994-1 (1985).
47. Hearings, supra note 2, at 34.
48. See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVI:4.
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"practices generally considered as subsidies." '49 The European Com-
munity based its attack of the United States DISC on article XVI:4.
The European Community identified the DISC as an illegal export
subsidy by pointing out that the unlimited deferral of income from
export practices constituted a remission or exemption of taxes.50
In 1976, a panel of GATT-appointed experts issued a series of
reports which found both the DISC taxation policies and certain tax
practices conducted by France, Belgium and the Netherlands to con-
stitute export subsidies in violation of article XVI of the General
Agreement.6" Although the GATT Panel was not completely con-
vinced that a tax deferral, for an indefinite time period, equaled a
remission or an exemption of taxes under GATT, the panel did find
that the DISC constituted a partial exemption that was improper
under the 1960 Illustrative List of Illegal Export Subsidies.52 In its
report, the GATT Panel found three consequences were likely to
follow from an export subsidy such as the DISC: (1) lowering of
prices, (2) increase of sales effort and (3) increase in profits per
unit." The Panel predicted that all three of these effects would occur
in connection with the DISC; therefore, it concluded that DISC was
in violation of article XVI:4 of GATT.54
No action on these Panel Reports was taken by GATT until
December, 1981. The delay was caused by negotiations and the for-
mulation of an "Agreement on Interpretation and Applications of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII" of the General Agreement. 55 The re-
vised list specifically added income tax "deferral" to the list of illegal
export subsidies."6 A footnote to the amended list, however, ex-
plained that if interest was charged (and collected) on the deferred
income, then no illegal subsidy would result.5
7
49. Items listed as illegal export subsidies include: (1) "The remission, calculated in
relation to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges on industrial or commercial enter-
prises;" and (2) "The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes ... "
Hearings, supra, note 2, at 21. See also GATT, article XVI:4 (Basic Instruments and Se-
lected Documents 9 Supp. 186).
50. Rosenblum, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51. Hearings, supra note 2, at 23.
52. Id. See also supra note 49.
53. The GATT Panel reports on the tax systems of France, Belgium and the Nether-
lands were similar to those on the DISC. Hearings, supra note 2.
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. Out of this new "interpretation" emerged an updated "Illustrative List of Ex-
port Subsidies" which had significant ramifications for the continued use of the DISC.
56. Hearings, supra note 2, at 89.
57. Under the Act, in addition to the FSC and small FSC, a third option will be availa-
ble to United States exporters: the interest charged the DISC. This alternative will be GATT-
compatible provided that the taxes which are deferred are eventually collected. Sanders, Trying
[Vol. 26
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In December, 1981, the GATT Council formally adopted the
1976 Panel Reports subject to certain qualifications.5 8 The three
qualifications are: (1) GATT does not require an exporting country
to tax economic events that occur outside its territorial limits; (2)
arm's-length pricing is mandatory, under GATT, in transactions be-
tween exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under common con-
trol; and (3) article XVI:4 does not prohibit the adoption of mea-
sures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income."' These
qualifications, referred to as the "1981 GATT Qualifier," legiti-
mized the territorial taxation systems of France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands and other European Community nations but left open
questions as to the legality of the United States taxation of the
DISC.
The United States and the European Community agreed that
the tax system of France, Belgium and the Netherlands satisfies the
1981 GATT Qualifier's first two requirements. These systems ex-
empt from taxation only those economic processes" located outside
their territorial limits and require arm's-length pricing on inter-com-
pany pricing."' Since the tax policies of the DISC met neither of the
two requirements contained in the 1981 GATT Qualifier, and thus
remained in violation of article XVI of GATT, the European Com-
munity submitted a formal complaint to the GATT Council in May,
1982 requesting that the Council force the United States DISC to
conform to GATT provisions.62 Furthermore, the complaint re-
quested $2.3 billion in compensation for damages allegedly caused by
the DISC."'
The adoption of the Panel Reports with the accompanying 1981
GATT Qualifier gave further impetus to United States policymakers
in reassessing the future of the DISC. To this end, Treasury Secre-
tary Donald T. Regan told the GATT Council on October 1, 1982
that the Reagan Administration would find a replacement for the
It Their Way, FORBES, October 22, 1984 [hereinafter cited as Sanders]. See infra text accom-
panying note 126.
58. Wagner, supra note 1.
59. Rosenblum, supra note 27, at 472-76. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 24-25.
60. See supra note 38.
61. Rosenblum, supra note 27, at 475-76. Arm's-length pricing means prices for goods
in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under common control should
be the prices that would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's-length.
Hearings, supra note 2, at Appendix B, p. 56.
62. See supra text accompanying note 27.
63. Rosenblum, supra note 27.
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DISC.6' In March 1983, the Administration announced its proposal
to meet its GATT commitment: the FSC would replace the DISC.
After almost two years of debate and several proposals, Presi-
dent Reagan signed the Act65 into law. The new policy was part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and would affect tax years beginning
January 1, 1985.66
III. WHY THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION IS NOT GATT-
COMPATIBLE
A. United States Response to GATT Criticism: FSC
After thirteen years of unwavering criticism aimed at the DISC,
as well as repeated threats of GATT sanctions, the United States
succumbed to its trading partners' pressure; the United States agreed
to replace the lucrative export subsidy with the "GATT-compatible"
FSC. While both the United States Treasury and Commerce De-
partments profusely lauded the DISC replacement for both its legal
basis and profit-generating potential, grave reservations were raised
by the European Community and others even before the proposal
became law." Indeed, such rumblings regarding the FSC's lack of
GATT-compatibility may well be the harbinger of a future GATT
contest.
The sentiment among United States legislators and supporters
of the new FSC is one of optimism and an unwillingness to compro-
mise to foreign pressure. This sentiment was exemplified by the un-
abashed warning given to the European Community, and other
would-be-antagonists at the initial United States Chamber of Com-
merce Conference on FSC: anyone who complains to GATT about
FSC will be viewed with disfavor.6 8 The consensus among the con-
64. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
65. Wagner, supra note 1, at 17.
66. Id.
67. Hearings, supra note 2, at 22.
68. The FSC Conference was held in Washington, D.C. on September 11, 1984 and
was sponsored by the United States Department of Commerce and Georgetown Law Center
for the Continuing Legal Education Division [hereinafter cited as FSC Conference]. The au-
thor of this comment attended the conference. The speakers who voiced these sentiments were
co-chairman of the Conference, Charles M. Bruce of the Washington D.C. law firm of Cole
and Corette, as well as United States Trade Rep. Timothy Regan. The point made by the
panel spokesman, Timothy Regan, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, was that the Euro-
pean Communities and other GATT members which forced the United States to change the
DISC should have no further objections because the U.S. had changed the DISC to the FSC.
No specific retaliatory measures were discussed because representatives from Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Canada were in attendance.
[Vol. 26
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ference panel members69 was that the United States had met its
GATT obligations by changing the DISC into the Foreign Sales
Corporation (FSC).
1. Forgiveness of DISC Income Taxes
Despite the bold optimism expressed by representatives of the
Administration, problems remain in the "GATT-compatibility" of
the FSC. There seems to be general agreement among the United
States trading partners that the most unacceptable provision of the
new legislation, in terms of "GATT compatibility," is "the forgive-
ness of the DISC income taxes."'70 One problem with this forgiveness
of taxes on the DISC income is that it placed United States trading
partners in a "Catch-22" situation.7 The trading partners could not
officially object to the forgiveness until the new law took effect Janu-
ary 1, 1985. However, once the law took effect, it was difficult to
reverse any resulting harm. Furthermore, the forgiveness of DISC
taxes constituted a tax "remission" which violates the General
Agreement.7 2
2. Elimination of the "Paper Entity"
A significant change in the new law is the foreign presence re-
quirement which will abolish the DISC both as a paper entity and
69. The Conference Panel Members included: Rachell Bernstein, Manager of Tax Pol-
icy Center - U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Charles M. Bruce, Cole and Corette, Washington,
D.C.; William R. Evan, U.S. Dept. of Commerce; John Gallagher, Marine Midland; Steven
A. Hornig, Cargill Inc.; James K. Jackson, Dawson, Riddle, Fox, Holroyd & Jackson; Ed-
ward H. Lieberman, Cole & Corette; H. Patrick Oglesby, Joint Committee on Taxation;
Timothy Regan, Office of U.S. Trade Representative; Stephen E. Shay, Office of International
Tax Counsel.
70. The European Communities were the first to openly object to the forgiveness. Bruce,
Recent FSC Developments, 25 TAx NOTES 596 (Nov. 12, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Bruce].
See also Europe Upset with U.S. Over Sales Program, The Washington Post, July 12, 1984,
at D6, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Europe Upset].
71. Telephone interview with John St. Jacques, Canadian Commercial Counselor, Ca-
nadian Consulate in Washington, D.C., (Nov. 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as St. Jacques Inter-
view]. Mr. St. Jacques' view does not reflect the official Canadian government's position which
has yet to be fully revealed. Without elaborating, Mr. St. Jacques affirmed this author's analy-
sis of his country's predicament discussed infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
72. Interview with Anna Snow, Assistant to the Commercial Counselor, Delegation of
the Commission of the European Communities in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 3, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Snow Interview]. The European Communities are waiting for the United States
explanation as to how the new legislation conforms with the 1981 GATT Panel Reports and
the GATT Qualifier before deciding whether to object formally to the GATT Council. The
European Communities estimate their losses caused by the FSC's predecessor, the DISC, to be
between $10 to $12 million. Europe Upset, supra note 70, at D6, col. 6.
1986]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
as an entirely domestic corporation. In order to qualify for an in-
come tax exemption under the Administration proposal, an FSC
must have foreign trading gross receipts (FTGR)73 In order to have
FTGR, a FSC must meet the following presence requirements:
1) Maintain an office outside the United States. The office
may be shared with other entities and need not be either in the
country where the FSC is incorporated or any country in which
it is doing business.
2) Maintain books and records in its foreign office. These
may be summary books and records, and need not be original
books of record or entry;
3) Have at least one resident director outside of the United
States; and
4) Participate outside of the United States, either itself or
by contract, in solicitation, negotiation, or acceptance of sales.74
3. Two-Part Test to Qualify for Tax Benefits Under the 1984
Act
For the FSC to meet GATT standards, it must comply with
both principle tenets of the 1981 GATT Qualifier which recognize
the legitimacy of territorial systems of taxation.7 5 The GATT Quali-
fier requires an exporting country to tax economic processes that
take place within its territorial limits.7" The foreign economic pro-
cess requirements of the FSC" are a positive step toward bringing
United States taxation of exporting corporations into compliance
with GATT rules. It is doubtful, however, that the new require-
ments go far enough to satisfy the GATT community.
a. Processes
There are two categories of foreign economic process require-
ments that the FSC must satisfy to qualify as having foreign trading
73. "Foreign trade gross receipts" is defined to mean gross receipts of any FSC attribu-
table to: (1) receipts from the sale or exchange of property for use outside the United States;
(2) leases or rentals of export property; (3) receipts from the performance of services; (4)
receipts from engineering or architectural services; and (5) receipts for export management
services. I.R.C. § 924(a) (1984).
74. Id. at §§ 922(a)(1), 924(d)(1)(A) (1984).
75. Field, GATT Acts on Export Tax Aid Panel Reports, 14 TAx NOTES 1485, 1486
(Dec. 14, 1981).
76. Rosenblum, supra note 27, at 475 & n.26 (1983).
77. See infra notes 78-82.
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gross receipts (FTGR).7 ' Both categories may be satisfied by the
FSC, or by another person on behalf of the FSC under a contractual
basis.7' The first category is known as the "selling activities." Under
this requirement, the FSC must participate outside the United States
in the solicitation (other than advertising), negotiation or making of
the contract giving rise to foreign trading gross receipts. 80
b. Direct Costs
The second category is the "direct cost test." Under this test, the
FSC must demonstrate, with respect to each transaction generating
the FTGR, the satisfaction of one of two tests. The first test is met if
fifty percent or more of the total direct costs incurred by the FSC
with respect to the five activities"1 are attributable to activities per-
formed outside the United States. The second test is met if eighty-
five percent or more of the total direct costs incurred by the FSC
with respect to each of the five activities are attributable to activities
performed outside the United States.82
B. FSC Falls Short of GATT Provisions
The facility with which a FSC may meet either of these tests
creates GATT compatibility problems. First, by utilizing the eighty-
five percent test, a FSC could, through careful planning, incur
eighty-five percent of the costs derived from its least expensive activi-
78. See supra note 73. An FSC shall be treated as having Foreign Trading Gross Re-
ceipts under the temporary regulations if: (1) the management of the FSC takes place outside
the United States; (2) all meetings of the board of directors of the FSC and all shareholder
meetings of the FSC take place outside the United States; (3) the principle bank account of the
FSC is maintained outside the United States; and (4) all dividends, legal fees, accounting fees
and salaries of officers of the FSC are disbursed out of bank accounts outside the United
States. I.R.C. §§ 924 (1984); Treas. Reg. § 1.924(c) (1984).
79. I.R.C. § 924(d)(1)(A) (1984).
80. Id.
81. The five activities referred to in the test are: 1) advertising and sales promotion; 2)
processing customer orders and arranging for delivery of the export property; 3) transportation
of the property to the customer; 4) determining and transmitting the final invoice or statement
of account and receiving payment; and 5) assumption of the credit risk. Id. at § 924(e).
The following is an illustration of how the 50% and 85% tests work:
If the total direct costs of the five activities is $1,000 and at least $500 of these
costs was attributable to activities performed outside the United States, the 50
percent test would be met. Alternatively, if the $1,000 total direct costs included
advertising costs of $100 and transportation costs of $200, of which $85 and
$170, respectively, were attributable to activities performed outside the United
States, the 85 percent test would be met.
Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-35.
82. I.R.C. § 924(d)(2) (1984).
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ties outside the United States while still satisfying the foreign eco-
nomic processes test.8" In essence, the FSC could circumvent the pur-
pose, if not the mandate, of article XVI:4 of GATT by relying on its
least expensive foreign activities to meet the eighty-five percent test.
The alternative, the fifty percent direct costs test, is equally easy
to meet. This test enables an FSC to conduct half of the activities
necessary to complete an export transaction within the United States
territorial limits.8
4
1. The European Community's Response to FSC
The European Community is concerned over the leniency of the
foreign economic process requirements.8" GATT requires that trade,
rather than fiscal implications, be the focal point of a taxation sys-
tem. The United States, however, uses a trade-related taxing "tool"
to achieve a reduction in its foreign trade deficit.8 A second concern
is that the "attribution of profits in relation to economic processes
discriminates in favor of United States versus foreign sharehold-
ers."8 7 The European Community is also concerned that some of the
foreign economic process requirements could be met on a "contrac-
tual basis""8 even if initiated in the United States. 9
83. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-36. The foreign economic process test is met by an
FSC which has Foreign Trading Gross Receipts and meets the "direct costs test." See supra
notes 78-82 and accompanying text; I.R.C. § 924(d)(2) (1984).
84. Canadian Commercial Counselor John St. Jacques expressed his government's con-
cern over the "50% United States content" provision, agreeing with this author that the re-
quirement is merely a "shell" designed to appease GATT Council members, while really
continuing to foster United States export activity at the same or higher rate as with the DISC.
St. Jacques Interview, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. Snow Interview, supra note 72. Ms. Snow stated that the European Community
considers the United States system of taxation to be a "partial application of the territorial
principal." She added that the United States system of "not taxing earnings from export sales"
violates article XVI:4 of GATT. Id.
86. In other words, the United States practices the converse of the GATT-approved
system of taxation.
87. Because the FSC provisions effectively tax most of the export profit resulting from
the sale of goods manufactured in the United States and maintain revenue neutrality or
equivalent tax benefits with the old DISC provisions, this income is not taxed again when
distributions are actually made from foreign trade income (FTI) to the United States corporate
shareholders. Consequently, actual distributions made from FTI to United States corporate
shareholders are eligible for a special 100% dividend received deduction; foreign shareholders,
on the other hand, must pay taxes on dividends. FSC Conference, supra note 68.
88. Contractual basis means that a commission agent of a FSC can perform the five
activities involved in making a contract with a foreign buyer by contract with the parent com-
pany in the U.S.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.924(d)-lT(a) (1984). The FSC or its agent may act upon standing
instructions of its parent corporation.
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2. Economic Processes Outside the U.S.
All of the European Community objections concerning the FSC
foreign economic process are based on the first provision of the 1981
GATT Qualifier. Under this provision, an exporting country is not
required to tax economic events which occur outside its territorial
limits. This means that economic processes occurring within the ter-
ritorial limits of the exporting nation must be taxed in order to pre-
vent an illegal export subsidy.9" Yet, under the new FSC, the United
States allows an exporter to qualify for a fifteen percent exemption
from United States taxes for export earnings, by meeting either the
fifty or eighty-five percent test.9 The United States trading partners
argue that if the United States is going to allow a substantial num-
ber of the activities connected with an export transaction to take
place within the territorial limits of the United States, those activities
should be taxed.9 2 It follows that the tax exemption or "remission" is
in violation of GATT insofar as any export-related activities are
conducted within the United States.
3. Price Regulation
Another FSC problem of GATT compatibility, which relates to
the second element of the GATT Qualifier, is the choice of pricing
rules given to FSCs. As explained in Section II of this comment, the
1981 GATT Council Qualifier made arm's-length pricing a pre-
requisite for compliance in all transactions in which exporting com-
panies and foreign buyers are under common control."3 Under the
90. Goldberg, supra note 20.
91. The 15% tax reduction is allowed under the "combined taxable income" method.
I.R.C. § 923 (1984). Other approaches yield even greater exemptions. See infra notes 93-99
and accompanying text.
92. Snow Interview, supra note 72.
93. Rosenblum, supra note 27. The portion of taxable income earned by a FSC is based
on the transfer pricing rules. The amount is either computed using arm's-length standards or
administrative pricing rules. In order to use the administrative pricing rules, the FSC must
either itself or through another person acting under contract perform all the activities under
the foreign economic process requirements. The taxable income of an FSC can be based on a
transfer price in an amount which does not exceed the greatest of the following:
(i) 1.83 percent of the FTGR derived from the sale of such property by an
FSC;
(ii) 23 percent of the combined taxable income of a FSC and the related
person attributable to the FTGR; or
(iii) Taxable income based upon the sale price actually charged, but subject
to the arm's-length rules of section 482.
Treas. Regs. §§ 1.924(d)-lT(e), 1.921-2T(h) (Q&As 12-13) (1985).
For purposes of section 925, the formulae contained in (i) and (ii) above are referred to as
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1984 Deficit Reduction Act, an FSC may choose between adminis-
trative pricing rules and arm's-length pricing."'
In order to use administrative pricing rules, the FSC, or an-
other person acting under contract, must perform all the activities
required by the foreign economic process." By allowing some of the
required foreign economic processes to be performed in the United
States, the temporary regulations make the use of administrative
pricing rules a direct violation of the second tenet of the Qualifier.
Similarly, the fact that the new law allows the transfer price to be
computed after the sale and close of the taxable year, appears to
conflict with the purpose of GATT."
More of the FSC's foreign trade income is excludable under the
arm's-length pricing method than under either of the two adminis-
trative pricing methods. If an FSC uses "arm's-length" transfer pric-
ing, thirty-two percent of its foreign trade income is exempt from
United States taxes. If, instead, the FSC uses the special administra-
tive pricing rules, it is only allowed a sixteen percent exemption. 7
Without the benefit of the administrative pricing rules, however, tax-
able income of an FSC would be based upon the sale price actually
charged by the related supplier.9" Instead, the FSC may compute its
taxable income attributable to a sale at the reduced rate using either
the 1.83% of foreign trading gross receipts or the 23% of combined
taxable income methods." Such obvious benefits which inure to the
FSC circumvent the GATT Qualifier because the benefits represent
export subsidization by the United States.
4. Foreign Presence
The final category of concern over the FSC involves the GATT
foreign presence requirements. Within this general category are a
number of significant problems of GATT-compatibility. Perhaps the
most objectionable provision of the FSC is that it may be organized
in one of four qualifying possessions: American Samoa, Guam, Com-
the "administrative pricing rules." According to the Temporary Treasury Regulations, all of
the activities referred to above do not have to take place outside of the United States. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 46. See also I.R.C. § 994(a)(l)-(3); Treas. Reg. §
994-1 (1985).
95. I.R.C. § 925 (1984).
96. Snow Interview, supra note 72.
97. I.R.C. § 923(a) (1984).
98. Id. at § 925(a)(3 (1984). The administrative pricing rules only apply to transac-
tions between related parties, in contrast to the arm's-length pricing provision under the new




monwealth of Northern Mariana Islands or the United States Virgin
Islands.' 00 The reason GATT required the United States to change
the export entity from the DISC to a FSC was that the DISC was
located within the United States. By requiring the exporting entity to
move its location outside the territorial limits of the United States,
the new law creates truly foreign source income which is not taxed
under the GATT Qualifier. In addition, the new law would comply
with the general purposes and policy objectives expressed in the
GATT Preamble.'01
5. Practical Effect of New Law
It is easy to understand why the United States trading partners
object to the organization of FSCs in United States possessions. As
was discussed above, the DISC's discriminatory tax treatment cost
the United States trading partners millions of dollars.10 2 The ques-
tion remains as to whether its replacement will do the same by per-
mitting organization in United States possessions, the so-called "tax
havens."' o
The probability of negative reaction by other GATT signatories
is linked, to a large degree, to the proportion of FSCs set up in
United States possessions. The United States trading partners will
not be able to realize the potential gain that would result from tax-
ing FSCs incorporated in their countries. Also, the European Com-
munity and other GATT nations will not easily accept the new leg-
islation's two year prohibition on the taxation of the foreign trade
income of FSCs incorporated in United States possessions.'
6. Treasury Department Regulations Exacerbate
Shortcomings
Although the Treasury Department released a list of 23 foreign
countries in which an FSC may be organized,'0 5 the United States
100. Snow Interview, supra note 72. See also St. Jacques Interview, supra note 71;
infra note 106.
101. The contracting parties are to enter into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." Preamble to GATT,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
102. Snow Interview, supra note 72.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bruce, supra note 70. The FSC acceptable countries of incorporation are: Austra-
lia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Jamaica, Korea, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines,
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possessions appear almost too inviting for most exporters to ig-
nore.' 0 6 An example is the United States Virgin Islands' (USVI)
FSC legislation which provides that foreign trade income on FSCs is
exempt for two years with only a 0.85% subsequent income tax.
107
In addition, an employer's tax credit, for eighty percent of wages
paid to USVI resident employees, is available. Similarly, no tax lia-
bility will be imposed at all if a FSC pays out $100,000 in qualify-
ing wages.' 08 Other benefits to FSCs located in the USVI include,
for example, tax credits against income tax for FSCs which use the
services of a qualified management firm and credits for wages paid
to local contractors used by the FSC.'0° In Guam, all FTI taxes are
exempt (after 1987); thus, the only charge imposed on a FSC con-
sists of a $1,000 annual license fee." 0 American Samoa imposes no
taxes on FSCs but has a one time incorporation fee of $100 and an
annual license fee of $500."'
With all of these attractive features luring potential FSCs to the
United States possessions, it is no wonder that several large corpora-
tions have chosen to organize FSC's in these territories. General
Electric Company has already organized a FSC in the USVI, while
Boeing is organizing one in Guam."' Many corporations will un-
doubtedly follow the lead of General Electric and Boeing, two of the
biggest winners under the new legislation's forgiveness of DISC in-
come taxes."18 Even small exporters like ICS Electronics in San Jose
are taking advantage of the relaxed regulations for small companies
by establishing a FSC in the Northern Mariana Islands.""
Companies like ICS, with foreign taxable incomes of less than
$5 million per year, can reap the tax exemptions without many of
the regular FSC headaches. The new legislation contains specific
South Africa, Sweden and Trinidad & Tobago. These are the countries which have currently
signed a CBI exchange of information agreement, or are countries which maintain a bilateral
income tax treaty with the U.S., and are certified by the Secretary of the Treasury as "carry-
ing out the purposes of this provision." Id.





111. Id. Kristof, supra note 12, at 28. As a New York Times staff writer recently
wrote, "it is probably no accident that the most attractive locations for Foreign Sales Corpora-
tions are . . . the Virgin Islands or the Bahamas." Id.
112. Id. at 27.
113. Id. G.E. had well over $300 million and Boeing had $300 million of their DISC's
deferred taxes forgiven. Id.
114. Id. at 28.
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provisions for small FSCs, which are designed to permit small busi-
nesses to take advantage of FSC provisions without meeting the more
complex foreign requirements.1"' Specifically, small FSCs are not re-
quired to meet the most onerous conditions of the FSC: the foreign
presence and economic processes requirements."' A small FSC may
qualify by merely leasing a room in the USVI and keeping books.1
The effect is, once again, circumvention of GATT mandates under
United States legislation enacted to stimulate export trade in the
United States.
Finally, even the "burdensome" foreign economic processes,
management and presence requirements have been relaxed by the
recent temporary regulations issued by the Treasury Department. "
To meet the foreign economic process requirements, the regulations
provide that "the FSC [or other person] may act upon standing in-
structions from another person in the performance of any activ-
ity."1 9 This means that the parent corporation located in the United
States can direct the FSC's activities while the FSC merely responds
to the orders. The similarities between the small FSC and the "pa-
per company" or the DISC are striking.2
The ease of meeting the foreign economic process test is also
aided by temporary regulation section 1.924(e), which provides that
activities will be deemed to take place where the FSC initiates them.
The location where the instructions actually originate is irrelevant
under the new law. Thus, the parent corporation in the United
States can control all activities by telephone, mail or telegraph while
the FSC is credited with "initiating" the "foreign" activity. It ap-
pears that the FSC can be manipulated by its related United States
supplier."' This regulation allows the FSC to act as a holding com-
pany rather than as an independent entity which performs real func-
tions. The consequences will be that the FSC, like its predecessor,
will be objectionable to GATT because it will receive the tax exemp-
tion while only performing perfunctory foreign exporting activities.
115. A small FSC must make an election to be treated like a small FSC; it cannot have
more than $5 million of export gross receipts and may not be a part of a controlled group of
corporations which includes any other FSC unless such other FSC elects small FSC status.
I.R.C. § 922(b) (1984).
116. All the foreign economic processes can be conducted in the U.S. This can result in
significant savings of administrative costs. Treas. Reg. § 1.921-27(h).
117. 49 Fed. Reg. 48273-92 (1984). These are the temporary Treasury Regulations.
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.924(d)-IT.
119. Goldberg, supra note 20.
120. 49 Fed. Reg. 48273-92 (1984).
121. FSC Conference, supra note 68.
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The other regulations regarding foreign presence and manage-
ment are equally facile and therefore objectionable under GATT
constructs. First, FSCs are required to maintain offices located
outside the United States in a qualifying country or eligible posses-
sion."' On its face, this appears to be a positive move toward
GATT-compatibility. Yet the regulations define an office as a build-
ing or a portion of building consisting of at least one room, regularly
used and operated for some corporate business, and owned or leased,
by the corporation or the corporation's dependent or independent
agent."'' Practically, this means that the parent corporation in the
United States can hire a management firm in the USVI (or other
possession) to lease a room in which to conduct the minimum busi-
ness required under the new law. To facilitate the organization of
FSCs, the Treasury Department allows FSCs to share facilities.
11 4
IV. A PROPOSAL TO BRING THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION
INTO CONFORMITY WITH GATT
Despite all its GATT incompatibility problems, the FSC is an
improvement over the DISC. In fact, the problems described in the
preceding section of this comment arose solely because the United
States goal of maintaining revenue neutrality outweighed its desire to
appease its trading partners.1 ' One only has to look to the $13 bil-
lion tax windfall given to the DISC shareholders,""' by virtue of the
forgiveness, to see that the current Administration had United States
exporters, rather than its GATT partners, in mind when it drafted
the new legislation. Thus, the problems which must be solved are:
(1) DISC forgiveness; (2) economic processes; (3) price regulations;
(4) presence requirements; and (5) small FSCs.
A. Forgiveness
The Administration justifies the forgiveness of tax on the
DISC's deferred income by labeling it a cost of enactment of the
FSC provisions. Proponents of the new legislation argue that taxing
the deferred income would impose too great a burden on the DISCs
122. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(D)(i) (1984).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.972-IT (emphasis added).
124. FSC Conference, supra note 68.
125. Revenue neutrality means that the revenue from a FSC will be equivalent (ap-
proximately) to that earned under a comparably sized DISC.
126. Sanders, supra note 57.
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and their shareholders.' The fact that most companies which used
the DISC "operated on the assumption that they would not have to
pay the taxes and incorporated the benefit into their earnings year
by year" bolstered the argument."' Not all the DISCs were so bold;
some showed a one-time benefit in the third or fourth quarter of
1984, the last year of the DISC."' Another purported argument in
favor of the forgiveness of DISC income is that it would be too diffi-
cult to determine the end of each DISC's fiscal year for purposes of
accounting for their profits.' 80
All of the arguments stem from the underlying assumption that
the tax break was given in order to create parity with the tax policies
of the other GATT countries. Exporters such as General Electric,
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, which will avoid paying a total of
at least $300 million in foreign taxes, believe that the tax break is
simply owed to them due to the United States government assur-
ances. "' The statutory language,' s8 however, indicates that DISCs
are only entitled to the deferral, and not the remission of taxes.
However, any exporter who formed a DISC must have known
that the European Community, Canada and others had been com-
plaining about the DISC even before its enactment in 1971. That
unrelenting attack culminated with the 1976 GATT Panel Reports,
and the 1981 adoption of those reports with the GATT Qualifier,
which declared the DISC to be an export subsidy in violation of
GATT. If the attacks and the reports did not put the DISC owners
on notice, then the European Community's request that GATT im-
pose sanctions on the DISCs, in July 1982, surely did.' Nor could
these exporting companies have failed to hear about the Reagan Ad-
ministration's 1982 concession to GATT which promised to change
the DISC and bring it into conformity with GATT."
Given the fact that United States companies that reaped the
127. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-34.
128. Kristof, supra note 12, at 28.
129. Id.
130. FSC Conference, supra note 68.
131. Id.
132. M. MOORE & R. BAGLEY, UNITED STATES TAX ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS
ABROAD 31 (1978). Concern with this deferral benefit led the Carter Administration to re-
quest its repeal by Congress. The repatriation of DISC income to its shareholders (the parent
corporation) is effectuated through the payment of dividends which are taxable upon receipt
and may afford the recipient a tax credit.
133. The European Community requested $2.3 billion in compensatory damages alleg-
edly caused by the DISC. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, July 27, 1982, at 597.
134. U.S. Will Seek Revised DISC Legislation in Response to Long-Term GATT Oppo-
sition, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, Oct. 5, 1982, at 5.
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benefits of the DISC, such as General Electric, had at least construc-
tive notice of the DISC's incompatibility with GATT, it does not
seem unjust or inequitable to place the burden of the deferred pay-
ments on them. The alternative is to allow the forgiveness which
indirectly shifts the burden to other GATT countries. Each DISC
user should bear the burden of the assumed risk that it would even-
tually have to pay the taxes. The United States trading partners,
who made no waiver of their right to object under GATT, should
not be burdened with the DISC shareholders' calculated risk.
However, requiring DISC shareholders to pay the accumulated
taxes in one lump sum would likewise be unjust; they expected to
pay the deferred taxes over a period of time and should not bear this
heavy burden merely because of a shift in United States tax policy.
One solution to this problem would be to tax the deferred DISC
income over a "ten year period." '135 This would lighten the immedi-
ate impact of the tax to the DISC shareholders and eliminate the tax
remission which is violative of GATT. Both sides would be treated
fairly under such a compromise.
B. Economic Processes - Direct Cost Tests
The second problem with the new legislation is that some of the
foreign economic process requirements can be met on a "contractual
basis" even in the United States."' The new law requires the FSC
to perform certain activities, directly related to the making of an ex-
port contract for goods or services, outside the United States territo-
rial limits. However, the temporary regulations effectively allow a
parent corporation to circumvent this requirement. The solution to
this problem is tightening the regulations by requiring that the FSC
perform all the export-related activities outside the United States.
The goal of the regulations should be to require the FSC to actually
conduct the export activities outside the United States and not simply
to go through the motions to appear GATT-compatible.
Intertwined with the foreign economic process test is the direct
cost test. The present legislation does not suffice because both the
fifty percent and the eighty-five percent tests allow the related sup-
plier to perform a large portion of export related activities within the
135. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-34. Goldberg also suggested this solution as a pos-
sible alternative. The author of this comment suggests that this solution is the only equitable
remedy to an otherwise GATT-incompatible law.
136. Snow Interview, supra note 72.
[Vol. 26
FSCs AND GATT
United States. " As examined in section II of this comment, the new
law allows a tax break for sales by FSCs even when partly per-
formed in the United States." 8
To solve this problem, the United States has two options: (1) it
can require that substantially all (approximately eighty-five percent)
of the export related activities be performed by the FSC outside the
United States territorial limits; or (2) it can tax that portion of the
activities conducted within the United States. Either method would
satisfy the GATT Qualifier which allows an exporting country not
to tax the foreign activities of exporters.
C. Price Regulations
The third GATT-compatibility problem of the FSC is the
choice of transfer pricing rules. " The GATT Qualifier required all
transactions between exporting companies and foreign buyers under
common control to use arm's-length pricing rules. Under the new
law, United States exporters are able to select either administrative
pricing or arm's-length pricing rules and this selection can be made
after the close of the taxable year. The effect is to create the obvious
advantage of a "wait-and-see" approach for United States exporters
which use the FSC. The answer to this problem is simply to require
arm's-length pricing in all transactions between the FSC and its re-
lated suppliers. Arm's-length pricing is GATT-mandated and will
prevent FSC shareholders from obtaining the windfall that their
counterparts received under the DISC.
D. Presence
The fourth problem of GATT-compatibility stems from the
ability of an FSC to organize in one of the United States posses-
sions.140 The concern is over the autonomy of the United States pos-
sessions and therefore the "foreign" nature of an FSC which chooses
to incorporate there. The new legislation requires the qualifying
possessions to impose no taxes on FSCs until 1987.4 In essence, the
137. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
138. Rosenblum, supra note 27, at 475.
139. St. Jacques Interview, supra note 71.
140. Snow Interview, supra note 72. This provision contradicts the Reagan Administra-
tion's proposal presented to GATT in March 1983. Under that proposal, a FSC could qualify
only if it were organized in a country with which the United States has an exchange of infor-
mation agreement. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 32-18.
141. It can be argued that this policy simply conforms with the 1981 GATT Qualifier
which provides that an exporting country can use devices to avoid double taxation. The
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FSC could locate in a United States possession, avoid paying any
foreign taxes for two years, and pay only a nominal amount thereaf-
ter. The consequence of such incorporation is that United States ex-
porters avoid the "cost-plus ' 42 taxation policy used by most of its
trading partners while still qualifying for the FSC tax exemptions.
Additionally, the legitimacy of incorporating in a United States
possession which remains under United States control, but is techni-
cally "outside" the United States customs zone, is in question. This
control is evidenced by the four qualifying possessions' submission to
United States pressure to postpone taxation of FSCs until 1987. The
possessions' dependence on the economic stimulus provided by FSC
incorporation - more jobs, leasing and purchasing of office space,
and the hiring of local management facilities - casts doubt on their
independence from United States control. This in turn raises a suspi-
cion about the "foreign" nature of the FSC.
The centerpiece of the new legislation is the removal of the
DISC to foreign soil. By allowing the FSC to locate in a United
States possession, the United States has not removed the taint of pro-
viding an export subsidy. The solution: return to our original
GATT commitment and require FSCs to be organized in a country
with which the United States has an exchange of information agree-
ment.1 43 This solution would cause the FSC program to be in com-
pliance with GATT, and United States exporters which utilize the
program would incur greater costs. The increased costs, however,
would be insignificant compared with the benefits to world trade. 44
E. Small FSCs
The fifth area of concern involves the small FSC.' 45 Under the
new law, the small FSC can get all the tax benefits of a large FSC
without having to meet foreign management and economic process
requirements. With the exception of being required to maintain
summary books of accounting and an office outside the United
States, the small FSC is hardly a "foreign entity" within the mean-
counter-argument, however, is that allowing FSCs to locate in "tax-haven" countries may in-
directly confer undeserved economic benefits on United States exporters.
142. "Cost-plus" means the cost of product plus an additional percent tax, usually 10%.
143. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
144. The benefits to world trade from full U.S. compliance with GATT and its 1981
Qualifier might erase many of the hostile feelings of our trading partners carried over from
U.S. enactment of the DISC. See Snow Interview, supra note 72.
145. Id. An in-depth discussion of the small FSC or the "Interest Charged DISC" is
beyond the scope of this paper. See Goldberg, supra note 20 for a more detailed discussion.
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ing of GATT. Again, the solution is simple: require the small FSC
to meet the more stringent foreign economic process requirements
outlined earlier in this comment and require small FSCs to incorpo-
rate in countries which have exchange of information agreements
with the United States.
A related issue involves the lenient foreign management re-
quirement which FSCs, but not small FSCs, must meet. Currently
an FSC must have a board of directors of which only one member
must be a non-United States resident. That "foreign" manager can
even be a United States citizen so long as he lives in the place of
incorporation. Nowhere in the new legislation is there more of a ruse
than in this provision. The solution is to require at least a majority
of the board of directors to be non-United States residents. This
would further the FSC's GATT-compatibility while simultaneously
improving relations with United States trading partners.
Under the temporary regulations, an FSC can do the bare mini-
mum required by the Treasury Department and still be considered
to be conducting business outside the United States. The regulations
only require that an FSC rent a room and do some business there.
This hardly seems to meet the "presence" outside the territorial lim-
its required by GATT. To rectify this problem, stiffer regulations of
the type described in this comment should be enacted, requiring at
least a permanent office with substantially all export activities con-
ducted therein.
V. CONCLUSION
January 1, 1985 marked the beginning of a new United States
exporting entity: the FSC. All indications point toward a warm re-
ception to the new legislation in this country. Attorneys, accountants
and other interested parties have flocked to FSC conferences across
the country so that they may represent potential and existing clients
who export products or services from the United States. Many
United States corporations such as General Electric, foreseeing the
revenue-producing potential of the FSC or small FSC, have already
set up offices in United States possessions. Even the European Com-
munity has welcomed the change from the DISC to the FSC.
Despite these initial favorable reviews, the FSC does not appear
to be consistent with GATT. One of the Reagan Administration's
stated goals in lobbying for the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act was to
close tax "loopholes." Yet the Deficit Reduction Act allows a $13.6
billion forgiveness of taxes to the DISC shareholders on income
earned from the DISC exporting vehicle.
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The grounds for objection to the forgiveness are found in the
GATT charter which prohibits illegal export subsidies by signatory
nations. Throughout the existence of the DISC, GATT members,
such as the European Community and Canada, objected to the defer-
ral partly based on their fears that the DISC income taxes would
never be collected. Rather than allay their fears, the United States
government proved that the European Community and others were
correct by forgiving back taxes owed by the DISC shareholders. The
European Community estimated that their losses suffered under the
DISC program were between $10 million and $12 million. United
States taxpayers will also indirectly absorb the loss of $13.6 billion
in revenue.
At the GATT council meetings beginning on November 6,
1984, the European Community requested that the United States ex-
plain how the new FSC legislation conforms to the GATT panel
reports on the DISC. The United States refused to have multilateral
consultations but has agreed to bilateral consultations. 46 The United
States has used disguised threats, negotiating techniques and tactical
devices to silence the complaints that surely would be raised by the
United States trading partners.
There are really no alternatives open to GATT member nations
which press the United States for FSC modifications, but do not
want the suspension of GATT. The inevitable result of a suspension
of GATT would be trade anarchy and the raising of protective tariff
barriers, halting the free flow of products between some of the most
productive trade nations.
Jeffrey F. Ryan
146. Letter from Ms. Anna Snow to the author (Nov. 28, 1984) (on file at the Santa
Clara Law Review office).
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